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Abstract 
 
In this paper we use the components of the PolityIV project’s polity2 and Vanhanen’s Index of 
Democracy indicators to analyse the relationship between de iure and de facto political institutions 
from 1820 until 2000 with a canonical correlation method, and a correction for the sample selection 
bias, caused by the change in the number of available countries. 
We find considerably fluctuation in the relationship between the two measures and that much of the 
observed correlation is due to the sample selection bias. The relationship becomes strong and positive 
only in the second half of the 20
th
 century. 
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1. De iure versus de facto political institutions 
 
The distinction between de iure and de facto institutions, or to be more precise, between de iure 
institutional setting versus de facto situation is a crucial element in explaining observed divergence in 
socio-economic outcomes (the distinction is introduced by Pande and Udry (2006)). North (1991) 
defines institutions as a set of rules that constraint individual behaviour. The reason d’etre for 
institutions is the reduction of transaction costs that increase as the potential market size and the degree 
of the division of labour grows. Without institutions, more complex structure of interdependent 
relations would be undermined by the potential gains from individual misbehaviour leading to distrust. 
The government, as principal, hence plays a fundamental role in shaping the fundamental rules of 
interactions, which takes the form of laws and practices. Yet, this crucial role of the state gives a 
special importance to political rights inasmuch as those who make the laws, may also use them to their 
own advantage. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) introduce the concept of inclusive versus extractive 
political institutions, the latter supporting the extractive economic institutions that are in place to 
channel resources from the society toward the elite. But the concept of elite that shape the laws is not a 
stationary one, as pointed out in their earlier work on the dynamics of regime changes (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2006). Whenever another interest group is growing up in a society, the ruling elite will face 
the choice of allowing them political rights leading to reforms or to resist them at the risk of revolution 
or a coup d’état. The process is not automatic, though, as there is an underlying non-linearity in this 
process: Acemoglu and Robinson find that regime changes are more likely to occur at intermediate 
levels of income inequality. The important consequence of this finding is that some societies can stuck 
in an extractive institutional setting in the long-run, which is a primary candidate to explain observed 
cross-country income differences. But written rules may also arrive from outside, such as happened 
historically in the case of colonization. Here we refer not as much to the celebrated reversal of fortune  
thesis of Acemoglu et al (2002) as to legacy of colonial legislation of the European powers in Sub-
Saharan Africa, which does not seem to have lasted long or, if they did, they led to inefficient 
outcomes. As Pande and Udry (2006) observes, the French and British rules regarding land ownership 
in their African colonies were different, yet, the pre-colonial customary laws still play a prominent role 
in many ex British and French colonies, independently of their colonial legal origin. Similarly, Blewet 
(1995) finds that the British laws in Kenya, introducing private property of lands actually destroyed a 
well-working land-management system leading to a relatively less efficient use of lands. Another 
example on an obvious difference in de iure and de facto institutions, is the Soviet Constitution of 
1936, which, even though clearly stated the Communist Party’s leading position, also granted the 
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freedom of consciousness and the equality under the law to all citizens, rights that remained pure 
words in one of the world’s most dictatorial police state of the period.   
One explanation for such deviation between the de iure and de facto political institutions is by Boettke 
et al (2008) who distinguish among foreign-introduced exogenous, indigenously introduced exogenous 
and indigenously introduced endogenous institutions. Exogenous institutions are constructed and 
forced from above, either by an indigenous group or by a foreign power (colonizer or an international 
organization). Endogenous institutions are the result of some spontaneous process. In the historical 
process of the evolution of institutions, indigenously introduced endogenous institutions predated all 
other type, being followed by endogenously introduced exogenous institutions, which were created by 
the ruling elite.  Boettke et al. claim that these different institution types exhibit different degree of 
hysteresis or stickiness, a concept closely related to path dependence
1
. Endogenous institutions are the 
stickiest of all, that will resist the effect of any new rules efficiently, and for a very long time. The least 
sticky institutions are the foreign-induced ones, which do not necessarily serve the interest of the 
population or the ruling elite. These may take the form of laws (such as Western type constitutions, 
introduction of general suffrage or a system of education) but will be inefficient, and once the external 
pressure ceases, they disappear. Hence, we can expect that the difference between de iure and de facto 
political institutions has grown with the globalization as non-European countries were increasingly 
subjected to the expectations of Western powers either directly (via colonization) or indirectly (by 
conditioning aid on political or economic reforms). There are historical examples, however, when 
foreign-induced institutions managed to replace indigenous institutions, such as democratization in 
Japan and Germany after World War 2, since these externally designed and forced changes were 
brought in conformity with certain indigenous traditions. Still the majority of the historical examples 
reflect the lack of success such as the fall of many democratic African regimes in the 1960s attests. 
Altogether, the distinction between de facto and de iure political institutions is of crucial importance 
for understanding the obvious differences one can find among the degree of democratization of 
countries when measured by different indicators, and it also offers an explanation why empirical 
research, using traditional methods such as regression analysis, on the relationship between 
democratization and aggregate socio-economic outcomes has limitations.    
       
2. Measuring democracy: limitations and possibilities 
 
                                                        
1 See Mahoney(2000) on the different theoretical explanaton behind path dependence observed in social structures.  
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To our knowledge no current empirical measures of democratization are explicitly concerned about the 
distinction between de iure and de facto institutions. They can all be placed into an underlying 
theoretical framework as suggested in the critical review article by Coppedge et al. (2011), based on 
different concepts of democracy. The most important theoretical point of departure is Dahl (1972) who 
introduced the concept of polyarchy, with competition and participation (or contestation and 
inclusiveness in his terminology) as two basic aspects of democracy. The identification of these two, 
theoretically measurable, component of democracy is a common factor behind both the PolityIV 
(polity) project (Marshall et al, 2012) and Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy (ID) (Vanhanen 2000, 
2003), that are still the most popular datasets stretching over the last two centuries (the polity project is 
constantly updated, currently having data on 167 countries for 1800-2012 while the ID includes 187 
countries for 1820-2000) and which we also use in this paper.
2
 Coppedge et al. (2008) show that the 
role of the factors competition and participation are predominant in all datasets and account for about 
three-quarter of the total variation. In this paper we rely on the fundamental assumption that even if 
both the ID and the polity attempt to capture the same dimensions of democracy, the latter is more 
successful in measuring actual outcomes through directly using statistics on voter turnout and the 
composition of parliaments, while polity is more measuring the formal rules and practices that shape 
political processes, being a product of secondary literature research and expert opinion. In other words, 
the ID reflects the de facto situation while the polity score (and its five components) is more about the 
de iure institutional framework. This is observed by Munck and Verkuilen (2002) who notes that the 
polity indicator is more concerned about the regulatory aspects of participation (if the elections are 
competitive or not), but it does not reflect the actual magnitude of participation at all.  
The above difference in the two indicators gives rise to different conclusions regarding the historical 
process of democratization (Figure 1) and the ranking of countries depending on which indicator is 
used. The polity 2 suggests that the global democratization process began in the mid-19
th
 century, 
while Vanhanen’s ID dates the begin of the process at the mid-20th century. The two aggregate 
indicators seem to converge only after the 1950s. This has serious implication on the theory of 
democratization as well. Huntington (2001, 2003) speaks of three waves of democratization, which is 
clearly visible on the polity2 score, while it is much less apparent in the ID. 
 
Figure 1  
                                                        
2
 Our choice was primarily motivated by our goal to use comparable data for the longest possible period. This is the reason 
why we do not use datasets that are available for shorter periods, such as the Freedom in the World by Freedom House 
which is available for only after 1972, the Democracy-Dictatorship data (Alvarez et al 1996, Przeworksy et al 2000) 
beginning in 1948 and the Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence Unit starting from 2006. We also exclude 
datasets that may have the historical dimension but are binary and hence do not exhibit enough variation for any 
meaningful multivariate analysis such as Boix et al. (2012) or the Democracy-Dictatorship data which also has this feature. 
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World average scores in different measures of the degree of democracy of political institutions, 1820-
2010, Polity2 score of the Polity IV project (-10/+10) and the Index of Democracy (%) 
 
Sources: the polity IV dataset by Marshall et al (2012) and the polyarchy data by Vanhanen (2000, 2003) 
 
The most striking difference can be observed for the United States and the United Kingdom, though. 
Figure 2 reflect a significant difference between the order of the United States and the United-
Kingdom in the democratization process. The polity IV project assigns very high score to the USA in 
the first half of the 19
th
 century, even though a considerable percentage of the population was still 
disfranchised. After the Civil War, the USA constantly has a maximum score of 10, which is only 
achieved by the UK after World War 1. The Index of Democracy exhibits a fundamentally different 
picture: both countries have a clear trend of increasing democracy, and the USA is overtaken by the 
UK around 1920, with the significant extension of political rights that results in more participation and 
competition.  Similar differences between the two measures can be observed for most Western 
European democracies after World War 2, for example in France, Switzerland and the Netherlands.  
 
Figure 2 
The polity2 and ID scores for the United States and the United Kingdom, 1810-2010, Polity2 score of 
the Polity IV project (-10/+10) and the Index of Democracy (%) 
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Sources: the polity IV dataset by Marshall et al (2012) and the polyarchy data by Vanhanen (2000, 2003) 
 
Table 1 
Components of the polity2 index and coding rules 
variable possible outcomes values weight in polity2 implied order  
XRCOMP 
Competitiveness 
of Executive 
Recruitment 
Election 3 2 4 
Transitional 2 1 3 
Selection 1 -2 1 
Unregulated 0 0 2 
XROPEN 
Openness of 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Open (“Election”) 4 1 6 
Dual: hereditary and 
election 
3 1 5 
Dual: hereditary and 
designation 
2 -1 2 
Closed 1 -1 1 
Unregulated 0 0 4 
Open(“No election” 4 0 3 
XCONST 
Constraint on 
Chief Executive 
Parity or subordination 7 4 7 
Intermediate 1 6 3 6 
Substantial limitation 5 2 5 
Intermediate 2 4 1 4 
Slight moderation 3 -1 3 
Intermediate 3 2 -2 2 
Unlimited Authority 1 -3 1 
PARCOMP 
Competitiveness 
of Political 
Participation 
Competitive 5 3 6 
Transitional  4 2 5 
Factional 3 1 4 
Restricted 2 -1 2 
Suppressed 1 -2 1 
Not applicable 0 0 3 
PARREG Regulated 5 0 3 
0
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Regulation of 
participation 
Multiple identity 2 0 3 
Sectarian 3 -1 2 
Restricted 4 -2 1 
Unregulated 1 0 3 
Source: Table 1 in Treier and Jackman (2008: 204), and Marshall et al (2013)  
 
   But conceptual limitations are not the only challenges a quantitative research has to cope with. 
Munck and Verkuilen (2002) discuss some important technical issues that have potentially highly 
significant consequences on the choice of statistical techniques and the results. The first important 
issue is the level of measurement. Most institutional indicators are measured on nominal scale (like the 
components of the polity2 score), which can usually be concerted to an ordinal scale based on some 
theoretical expectations as done by Treier and Jackman (2008). On nominal scale one can measure if a 
country’s political system fulfils certain qualitative condition, but no further arithmetic operation 
makes sense. The only information conveyed by such variables is the difference among countries from 
a certain aspect. On an ordinal scale at least an order is established, e.g., one can state that a country 
where the chief executives are given authority by hereditary succession (XRCOMP=1 in the polity IV 
dataset) has a lower rank compared to the situation when they are elected (XRCOMP=3) from the 
perspective of democratization, but again, even the most fundamental operations like addition are 
pointless: one could assign any arbitrary numbers to the different outcomes as long as they preserve 
the order. In other words, assigning the number 0 to the XRCOMP=1 case, and 100 to the 
XRCOMP=3 case would still convey the same information on the order of possible outcomes, but it 
would change the mean from 1.5 to 99.5. Most statistical methods are designed for variables 
measurable by at least interval scale, where the operations summation and subtraction makes sense, 
and basic statistics, like the mean or the standard deviation can be defined.  
The polity project addresses this problem by assigning arbitrary numbers (weights) to different 
outcomes and sum them up to an aggregate measure labelled as polity2 in Polity IV (see Table 1).
3
 
Numerous studies use this aggregate measure as an explanatory variable even though, unless the 
arbitrary weighting accidently coincides with the theoretically correct one, this practice leads to an 
omitted variable problem and biased coefficient estimates (see Appendix 1 for a proof).  
Another issue is the inclusion of redundant variables as a result of arbitrary aggregation methods. The 
polity2 score the sum of the weighted components, which completely neglects the effect and 
importance of covariance among the components: components are correlated simply because, to a 
different extent, they contain the same information (see Table 2 and 3). Hence, they are partly 
redundant, since we could extract the same information from them. Adding these components up is 
                                                        
3 Marshall et al (2013) warns about the possible shortcomings of their aggregation method in their manual.  
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consequently a form of double counting, resulting in an aggregate component that has more variance, 
than it should have if it were correctly representing the underlying latent democracy. The same applies 
to the multiplicative aggregation adopted by Vanhanen who creates his aggregate Index of Democracy 
by multiplying observed data on participation (voter turnout) and competition (one minus the share of 
the winning party in the parliament). This method assures that only countries that have a balanced 
performance in both aspects will have a high ID score, but there is no further reason to prefer it above 
the additive aggregation.  
 
Table 2 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients between components of the polity2 score in 2000 
 XRCOMP XROPEN XCONST PARREG PARCOM 
XRCOMP 1     
XROPEN 0.884 1    
XCONST 0.840 0.691 1   
PARREG 0.801 0.629 0.808 1  
PARCOM 0.790 0.691 0.839 0.784 1 
N=151, note: we adopted the same ranking as Table 1 in Treier and Jackman (2008) 
 
Table 3 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients between components of the polity2 score in 1900 
 XRCOMP XROPEN XCONST PARREG PARCOM 
XRCOMP 1     
XROPEN 0.853 1    
XCONST 0.533 0.498 1   
PARREG 0.560 0.463 0.513 1  
PARCOM 0.578 0.575 0.502 0.719 1 
N=51, note: we adopted the same ranking as Table 1 in Treier and Jackman (2008)  
   
But Tables 2 and 3 have an additional inconvenient message about usual weighting methods: the 
degree of correlation changes over time, and hence the weights applied for aggregation cannot remain 
constant either.      
 
3. Methodology 
 
It may be tempting at first sight to apply a simple dimension reducing method, such as Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) or an Exploratory Factor Analysis on the components of democracy to 
arrive at some less arbitrary weighting scheme. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that any of the 
principal components (or factors) would be the latent democracy variable even if we use a rotation to 
arrive at easier interpretable factors. In a PCA (which is usually the first step in a factor analysis) the 
component loadings are identified so that the resulting principal components explain most of the 
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variance observed in the data, and the sum of squared loadings is one. But the observed correlation 
among different components may include measurement errors or the effect of other external factors 
that are not related to democratization and should be treated as noise rather than signal. It is hence 
advisable either to rely on methods that introduce additional, theoretically formulated restrictions on 
the estimated weights, such as Canonical Correlation (CC), Structural Equation Modelling (SEM), or 
other latent variables methods such as Pemstein et al (2010). Yet one should be aware that the resulting 
estimates for the latent democracy variable depend on a set of assumptions. Pemstein et al (2010), for 
example, rely on the assumption that different democracy measures actually measure the same latent 
variable and any observed difference are due to methodological differences and random measurement 
errors. These effects are then filtered out to arrive at a unified measure. In this paper however, our 
main assumption that we demonstrate in the next section, is that the Polity project and Vanhanen’s 
dataset do not measure the same process, even though they are correlated. 
We therefore use a canonical correlation approach to find out how the relationship between de iure and 
de facto political institutions changed over time. With canonical correlation we look for those weights 
(or coefficients) that maximize the correlation between two component variables (or canonical 
variates) that contain the components of polity2 and ID respectively. The underlying theory can be 
summarized as a block diagram (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 
The theoretical outline of the canonical correlation model 
 
 
The components of the polity2 score and the Index of Democracy are used to arrive at an estimate for 
the two latent variables de iure and de facto political institutions. The crucial theoretical assumption 
that identifies the coefficients of the observed variables is that two latent variables are correlated. If the 
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majority of political systems in the World exhibit a strong internal consistency between de iure and de 
facto institutions, we should obtain a high canonical correlation coefficient. In the case the two are not 
related, the canonical correlation should approach zero. Unfortunately, using canonical correlation has 
a price too. Since the five components of the polity2 indicator are strongly correlated, we cannot use 
them as dummy variables for the canonical correlation analysis, since they are usually perfectly 
collinear. As an intermediary solution, we adopt the arbitrary weighting scheme by Marshal et all 
(column 4 of Table 1), but we allow each component to have their own weight.
4
 While an imperfect 
solution, this still allows a room for a reweighing of the components, and redundant variables will still 
yield a close to zero coefficient.  Also, exceptional events, denoted by codes -66, -77 and -88 in the 
polity dataset are treated as missing values. We used modern countries, hence the data on historical 
states that has no obvious equivalent today are omitted either. 
Finally, since we use long-term historical data we also need to cope with the problem of sample 
selection bias. Namely, the probability that a country is included in the data is not random and may be 
correlated with the value of the components included in the analysis. Initially we have observations on 
the developed Western nations such as the USA, the United Kingdom and France, while from the last 
decades of the 19
th
 century we will have data on the periphery to an increasing extent. Also the number 
of countries increased steadily in the sample period. One should not underestimate the importance of 
selection problems in cross-country analyses. Since countries with endogenously developed more 
efficient institutions will have a higher chance of being observed (with probably less noise than 
latecomers), the estimated correlation may easily be biased upward. The problem has been described 
by Heckman (1979) who showed that this selection problem can be interpreted and treated as a form of 
omitted variable bias. We follow his first, two-step procedure for the canonical correlation. In the first 
step we estimate the probability if the components of the polity2 and the ID were observed for a 
particular year conditioned on the subcontinent it is situated on with a probit model.
5
 The results of the 
first step are reported as Table 4 and Table 5 in Appendix 2. In the second step we use the two Inverse 
                                                        
4 Unfortunately there is no canonical correlation method designed for ordinal variables. If one were to design such a 
method, the choice of weights would matter only as much as they affect the order of the possible values of the components. 
Yet, the established order should be primarily theory driven, hence it is questionable if a “canonical rank correlation” 
would make practical sense.  
5 The subcontinents loosely follows the Clio-Infra project’s adopted geographical categorization. The regions are:  Western 
and Northern Europe, Eastern Europe (including the USSR and later its successors west of the Ural), Southern Europe, 
North America, Central America and the Caribbean, South America, Australia and Oceania, East-, West-, South-, 
Southeast- and Central-Asia, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Mills ratios
6
 estimated form the first step, as additional variables in the canonical correlation analysis. 
These should correct for the effect of selection bias in the coefficients, and once we use these corrected 
coefficients to estimate the latent de facto and de iure political institution indices, we can estimate the 
linear correlation coefficient between them as a canonical correlation coefficient corrected for 
selection bias. 
 
4. Results   
 
The results from the canonical correlation analysis on decadal averages are reported as Table 6 in 
Appendix 3. The coefficients suggest that redundancy was indeed a significant issue, as usually only 
one or two components are found to significant at at least 10%, and the rest is usually very close to 
zero. We also carried out the estimation per year, but since the results are basically the same, for 
convenience we report only the decadal estimates in Table 6. The figures are created from the annual 
estimates for the canonical correlation, however, as these reflect a more precise picture. Figure 4 has 
all estimated canonical correlations and the number of observations in a single graph. 
 
Figure 4 
Estimated canonical correlation coefficients per year 1820-2000 
 
  
                                                        
6
 The Inverse Mills ratio is the ratio of a probability density function of a probability distribution to its cumulative 
distribution function. 
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Figure 5 reveals a slow increase in the first canonical correlation coefficient
7
 ranging between 0.508 in 
1873 and 0.947 in 1982. Even though these estimates are still biased by the selection problem, a trend 
can already be established. Until about the 1860s the relationship between the two group of indicators 
was relatively strong, which weakened until 1873 and slowly increased until World War I which 
resulted in a temporary drop. In the 1930s we find a minor setback, followed by World War 2, which 
had a seemingly smaller effect than World War 1, and the strong correlation gradually restores finally 
by the 1960s.  
 
Figure 5 
The first canonical correlation coefficient (without correction for sample selection) 
 
 
 
Figure 5 tells us a story which is in accordance with standard knowledge about the historical 
democratization process. De iure political institutions and de facto practices become less connected in 
periods of fundamental changes or crises such as World War I and II, the Great Depression.  
Once we correct for sample selection biases, the magnitude of the correlation changes fundamentally 
(Figure 6). As Table 6 attests, the effect of selection bias on the estimated canonical variates as the 
coefficients are positive and significant. In other words, the omitted selection bias indeed resulted in an 
overestimation of the relationship between de iure and de facto institutions, and also biased the 
coefficients. In case of the components of the ID, we even obtain periods when none of the variables 
yield a significant coefficients, indicating a complete detachment between de iure and de facto 
institutions.   
 
                                                        
7 We use and report the first (highest) canonical correlation.   
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Figure 6 
The first canonical correlation coefficient (with correction for sample selection) 
 
 
The first obvious difference is that the corrected canonical correlation coefficients have much larger 
variation and becomes even negative in the 1930s. Yet, one should bear in mind that the probability 
that a country is included in the sample is also result of an estimation and this introduces additional 
error. For this reason we apply a Hodrick-Prescot filter (λ=100) on the obtained corrected first 
canonical correlation coefficients (Figure 7). OF course the filtering method is based on certain 
assumptions, we decided to follow the original paper (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) in choosing the 
main parameter as 100, which results in smoother results than the alternative (6.25) suggested by Ravn 
and Uhlig (2002) for annual data. 
Figure 7 
Filtered canonical correlation coefficients (HP filter with λ=100) 
 
 
Figure 7 makes the overall picture easier to see: after an initial, moderate, positive relationship, the 
corrected canonical correlation coefficients approach zero, meaning that the two group of measures 
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become linearly independent, and we see a lasting upward trend only after World War 2.A really 
strong, positive relationship, that would confirm that the polyarchy dataset by Vanhanen and the Polity 
IV data by Marshall et al, measures the same underlying process is only found from the 1970s on. 
Table 6 offers more information on what exactly is responsible for the pattern observed in Figure 6 and 
7. The inclusion of the Inverse Mills ratios, that capture the effect of sample selection causes all 
coefficients to became statistically insignificant from the 1840s until the 1910s and 1920s. Their 
positive coefficients reflect that basically all observed linear correlation between the de facto and de 
iure institutional variables was caused by the selection bias.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we claim that the components of the polity2 indicator of Polity IV and the political 
competition and participation components of Vanhanen’s polyarchy dataset (or Index of Democracy), 
while conceptually related, measure two different aspects of political institutions. The former is more 
indicative of the de iure, while the latter is more reflecting the de facto institutions. We can use this 
difference to estimate the relationship between the two group of institutions in the long-run by a 
canonical correlation analysis. We also find that the selection bias has a strong effect on the outcomes, 
hence a correction is necessary. The corrected canonical correlation reflects considerable changes in 
the relationship between de iure and de facto political institutions in time. The relationship becomes 
even non-existent from the 1840s until the 1920s and it becomes strong only from the 1970s on, 
altogether giving rise to a trend that reminds of an U-shape, that may arise from the non-linearity of 
regime changes as suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), even though with the lack of annual 
data on within country inequality this is difficult to prove.  
These results are indicative that the degree to which formal rules can translate into outcomes is also 
dependent on some other factors, hence it raises doubts regarding the role of the historical changes in 
de iure political institutions in the early waves of democratization. It is also noteworthy that the 
consistency between the two types of political institutions is a recent phenomenon, which coincides 
with the start of globalization. The conclusion is hence that it is very likely that this high correlation is 
due to the enforcing power of international markets and organizations, which results in a permanent 
pressure on indigenous political institutions to adopt foreign-induced, exogenous political institutions 
using the terminology by Boettke et al (2008). 
 
 
References 
15 
 
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2006), Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New 
York: Cambridge University Press 
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2012) Why nations fail? The origins of power, prosperity, and 
poverty. Crown Business  
Acemoglu, D.,  Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. A. (2002) Reversal of Fortune: Geography and 
Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 117, No. 4, 1231-1294. 
Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. A., Limongi, F. & Przewroski, A. (1996). Classifying political 
regimes". Studies in Comparative International Development. Vol. 31(2), 3–36. 
Blewett, Robert A. (1995). “Property Rights as a Cause of the Tragedy of the Commons: Institutional 
Change and the Pastoral Maasai of Kenya.”Eastern Economic Journal 21(4): 477–490. 
Boettke, P. J., Coyne, C. J. Leeson, P. T. (2008) Institutional Stickiness and the New Development 
Economics, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Volume 67, Issue 2, 331–358 
Boix, C., Miller, M., and Rosato, S. (2012), A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800-2007. 
Comparative Political Studies, online version ahead of print, doi:10.1177/0010414012463905 
Coppedge, M, Alvarez, A. and Maldonado, C. (2008) Two Persistent Dimensions of Democracy: 
Contestation and Inclusiveness, The Journal of Politics Vol. 70(3), 632-647. 
Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, S., Hicken, A., Kroenig, M., Lindberg, S. 
I., Mcmann, K., Paxton, P., Semetko, H. A., Skaaning S., Staton, J., and Teorel, J. (2011) 
Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach (l), Perspectives On Politics Vol. 9(2), 
247-267. 
Dahl, R. A.  (1972). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. 
Heckman, J. (1979). "Sample selection bias as a specification error". Econometrica 47 (1): 153–161. 
Hodrick, R,, and Prescott, E. C. (1997) Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical 
Investigation, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 29 (1), 1–16. 
Huntington, S. P. (1991) Democracy’s third wave. Journal of Democracy, 2(2), 12-34. 
16 
 
Huntington, S. P. (1993) The third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century. University of 
Oklahoma Press 
Mahoney, J. (2000) Path Dependence in Historical Sociology, Theory and Society, Vol. 29(4), pp. 
507-548. 
Marshall, M. G., Gurr, T. R., and Jaggers, K. (2013) Polity™ IV Project. Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012 Dataset Users’ Manual. Center for Systematic Peace. 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2012.pdf 
Munck, G. L. and Verkuilen, J. (2002) Conceptualizing and measuring democracy. Evaluating 
Alternative Indices. Comparative Political Studies, 35(1), 5-34. 
North, D. C. (1991) Institutions, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), pp. 97–112 
Pande, R. and Udry, C. (2006) Institutions and Development: A View from Below, in Advances in 
Economics and Econometrics 2006, Blundell, Newey and Persson, eds. 
Pemstein, D., Meserve, S. A. and Melton, J. (2010) Democratic Compromise: A Latent Variable 
Analysis of Ten Measures of Regime Type. Political Analysis (2010) 18:426–449 
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. F., Cheibub, J. A., and Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy and Development. 
Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
Ravn. M. O. and Uhlig, H. (2002) On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the frequency of 
observations," The Review of Economics and Statistics vol. 84(2), 371-375. 
Treier, S. and Jackman, S (2008) Democracy as a Latent Variable, American Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 52(1), 201–217. 
Vanhanen, T. (2000) A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810-1998. Journal of Peace Research 
37 (2): 251-265. 
Vanhanen, T. (2003) Democratization: A Comparative Analysis of 170 Countries. London: Routledge. 
  
17 
 
Appendix 1 
The possible consequence of arbitrary weighting in aggregation of nominal variables in linear 
regressions 
 
Let us assume that z is an aggregate measure of an important factor, that is calculated as a weighted 
sum of k components. In matrix form: z Zb  where, z is an nx1 vector if the aggregate measure, Z is 
a nxk matrix of the k components of the aggregate measure z and b is a kx1 vector of weights. In a 
regression one is usually interested in measuring the partial (ceteris paribus) effect of z on a dependent 
variable y(an nx1 vector), with p explanatory variables included. We can assume that even if the 
components of Z are measured on the nominal level, there exists a vector of weights c that can be 
considered as ideal in the sense that Zc would capture the underlying latent variable while fulfilling 
the requirement of exogeneity, that is, ( | ) 0E e Zc . The population regression function is: 
  Y Xβ Zcγ e , where X is an nxp matrix of explanatory variables, and β is a px1 vector of 
coefficients. The regression equation that one estimates of the sample is, however: 
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ     y Xβ zγ u Xβ Zbγ u ,  
 
Since there is no guarantee that b=c, the residual u will contain the effect of using the wrong weights:   
 ˆ ˆ( )    u e X β β Z cγ bγ , with the OLS estimates of the coefficients being biased as follows:  
1ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )E   T Tβ β X X X Z bγ cγ and  
1 ˆˆ( ) ( )E

  T T T Tγ γ b Z Zb b Z X β β . 
 
Appendix 2 Results from the probit models (first step of the Heckman method) 
 
Table 4 
Probit estimation for the avaialibaility of polyarchy components per decade 1820s-2000 
(t-statistics are reported in parentheses) 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                  1820s            1830s           1840s           1850s           1860s          1870s               
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
NWEurope                    0.788           0.888           1.663***        1.663***        1.755***        1.755*** 
                           (1.37)          (1.55)          (3.52)          (3.52)          (3.72)          (3.72)    
SEurope                     0.131           0.380           1.059**         1.059**         1.257**         1.257**  
                           (0.20)          (0.61)          (1.98)          (1.98)          (2.41)          (2.41)    
EEurope                    -0.000           0.000           0.679           0.679           1.094*          1.387**  
                          (-0.00)          (0.00)          (1.03)          (1.03)          (1.85)          (2.45)    
NAmerica                    0.541           0.541           1.220           1.220           1.809***        1.809*** 
                           (0.66)          (0.66)          (1.61)          (1.61)          (2.59)          (2.59)    
CAmerica                   -0.196           0.434           1.318***        1.318***        1.318***        1.318*** 
                          (-0.32)          (0.75)          (2.80)          (2.80)          (2.80)          (2.80)    
SAmerica                    1.563**         1.949***        2.628***        2.628***        2.628***        2.628*** 
                           (2.52)          (3.09)          (4.86)          (4.86)          (4.86)          (4.86)    
AustOc                       
                             
EAsia                       0.709           0.709           1.387**         1.387**         1.387**         1.387**  
                           (1.00)          (1.00)          (2.20)          (2.20)          (2.20)          (2.20)    
WAsia                      -0.262          -0.262           0.417           0.417           0.417           0.417    
                          (-0.37)         (-0.37)          (0.67)          (0.67)          (0.67)          (0.67)    
SAsia                       0.541           0.541           1.220**         1.220**         1.220**         1.220**  
                           (0.79)          (0.79)          (2.01)          (2.01)          (2.01)          (2.01)    
SEAsia                                                      0.679           0.679           0.679           0.679    
                                                            (1.03)          (1.03)          (1.03)          (1.03)    
CAsia                         
                                
NAfrica                       
                                
SubSahAfrica                 
                                
Constant                   -1.383***       -1.383***       -2.062***       -2.062***       -2.062***       -2.062*** 
                          (-2.66)         (-2.66)         (-5.06)         (-5.06)         (-5.06)         (-5.06)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pseudo R2                    0.152           0.148           0.207           0.207           0.203           0.201    
N                             164             164             215             215             215             215    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   1880s           1890s           1900s           1910s          1920s           1930s               
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
NWEurope                    1.453***        1.453***        1.453***        1.608***        1.695***        1.695*** 
                           (3.65)          (3.65)          (3.65)          (4.41)          (4.64)          (4.64)    
SEurope                     0.955**         0.955**         0.955**         0.931**         0.931**         0.931**  
                           (2.10)          (2.10)          (2.10)          (2.23)          (2.23)          (2.23)    
EEurope                     1.085**         1.085**         1.329***        1.775***        1.565***        1.565*** 
                           (2.14)          (2.14)          (2.70)          (3.86)          (3.42)          (3.42)    
NAmerica                    1.507**         1.507**         1.507**         1.311**         1.311**         1.311**  
                           (2.31)          (2.31)          (2.31)          (2.07)          (2.07)          (2.07)    
CAmerica                    1.016**         1.016**         1.194***        0.999***        0.913**         0.999*** 
                           (2.56)          (2.56)          (3.05)          (2.78)          (2.52)          (2.78)    
SAmerica                    2.326***        2.326***        2.326***        2.131***        2.131***        2.131*** 
                           (4.86)          (4.86)          (4.86)          (4.70)          (4.70)          (4.70)    
AustOc                                                      0.314           0.119           0.119           0.119    
                                                           (0.65)          (0.26)          (0.26)          (0.26)    
EAsia                       1.085*          1.085*          1.085*          0.890           1.246**         1.246**  
                           (1.88)          (1.88)          (1.88)          (1.60)          (2.34)          (2.34)    
WAsia                       0.115           0.115           0.115          -0.080           0.283           0.723*   
                           (0.20)          (0.20)          (0.20)         (-0.15)          (0.60)          (1.70)    
SAsia                       0.918*          0.918*          0.918*          1.040**         1.040**         1.040**  
                           (1.66)          (1.66)          (1.66)          (2.07)          (2.07)          (2.07)    
SEAsia                      0.377           0.377           0.377           0.182           0.182           0.182    
                           (0.62)          (0.62)          (0.62)          (0.31)          (0.31)          (0.31)    
CAsia                        
                               
NAfrica                                                                                     0.344           0.344    
                                                                                           (0.55)          (0.55)    
SubSahAfrica                                               
    
Constant                   -1.760***       -1.760***       -1.760***       -1.565***       -1.565***       -1.565*** 
                          (-5.49)         (-5.49)         (-5.49)         (-5.57)         (-5.57)         (-5.57)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pseudo R2                    0.179           0.179           0.183           0.206           0.194           0.181    
N                             215             215             242             242             251             251    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  1940s            1950s           1960s          1970s           1980s           1990s           2000         
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
NWEurope                    1.695***        1.336***       -0.498*         -0.964***       -1.050***       -1.075***       -0.875*** 
                           (4.64)          (3.99)         (-1.67)         (-3.06)         (-3.28)         (-3.20)         (-2.72)    
SEurope                     0.931**         0.659*         -1.021***       -1.487***       -1.572***       -0.957**        -1.159*** 
                           (2.23)          (1.68)         (-2.90)         (-4.05)         (-4.23)         (-2.52)         (-3.20)    
EEurope                     1.565***        1.293***       -0.541          -1.007**        -1.093***                       -0.125    
                           (3.42)          (2.97)         (-1.33)         (-2.40)         (-2.58)                         (-0.26)    
NAmerica                    1.311**         1.039*         -0.795          -1.261**        -1.346**        -1.546**        -1.346**  
                           (2.07)          (1.69)         (-1.33)         (-2.08)         (-2.21)         (-2.51)         (-2.21)    
CAmerica                    0.999***        0.727**        -0.946***       -1.043***       -0.913***       -1.113***       -1.057*** 
                           (2.78)          (2.21)         (-3.31)         (-3.48)         (-2.98)         (-3.46)         (-3.46)    
SAmerica                    2.131***        1.859***        0.250           0.060          -0.025          -0.225          -0.527    
                           (4.70)          (4.33)          (0.60)          (0.13)         (-0.05)         (-0.47)         (-1.26)    
AustOc                      0.119          -0.153          -1.586***       -1.772***       -1.738***       -1.724***       -1.523*** 
                           (0.26)         (-0.35)         (-4.55)         (-5.18)         (-5.11)         (-4.97)         (-4.58)    
EAsia                       1.883***        1.611***       -0.223          -0.689          -0.774          -0.974*         -1.093**  
                           (3.54)          (3.15)         (-0.46)         (-1.38)         (-1.54)         (-1.90)         (-2.21)    
WAsia                       1.311***        1.167***       -0.416          -0.483          -0.568          -0.451          -0.418    
                           (3.29)          (3.15)         (-1.24)         (-1.33)         (-1.55)         (-1.13)         (-1.11)    
SAsia                       2.089***        1.817***       -0.017          -0.166          -0.251          -0.451          -0.251    
                           (4.16)          (3.78)         (-0.04)         (-0.33)         (-0.50)         (-0.88)         (-0.50)    
SEAsia                      1.134**         1.724***        0.426          -0.040          -0.125          -0.325          -0.125    
                           (2.42)          (3.87)          (0.91)         (-0.08)         (-0.26)         (-0.66)         (-0.26)    
CAsia                       
                                 
NAfrica                     0.344           1.433***       -0.111          -0.577          -0.662          -0.862*         -0.662    
                           (0.55)          (2.96)         (-0.24)         (-1.20)         (-1.37)         (-1.74)         (-1.37)    
SubSahAfrica               
                               
EEurope                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                  
Constant                  -1.565***       -1.293***        0.541***        1.007***        1.093***        1.293***        1.093*** 
                          (-5.57)         (-5.37)          (2.92)          (4.75)          (4.98)          (5.37)          (4.98)    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pseudo R2                    0.194           0.176           0.126           0.150           0.145           0.129           0.113    
N                             251             251             251             251             251             239             251    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 5 
Probit estimation for the avaialibaility of polity2 components per decade 1820s-2000s 
(t-statistics are reported in parentheses) 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                  1820s            1830s          1840s           1850s           1860s           1870s               
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
NWEurope                    0.519           0.625           1.567***        1.265***        1.361***        1.453*** 
                           (0.85)          (1.03)          (3.30)          (3.14)          (3.40)          (3.65)    
SEurope                     0.217           0.416           1.257**         0.955**         1.126**         1.126**  
                           (0.33)          (0.65)          (2.41)          (2.10)          (2.53)          (2.53)    
EEurope                    -0.162          -0.162           0.679           0.792           1.085**         1.329*** 
                          (-0.21)         (-0.21)          (1.03)          (1.48)          (2.14)          (2.70)    
NAmerica                    0.379           0.379           1.220           0.918           1.507**         1.507**  
                           (0.45)          (0.45)          (1.61)          (1.28)          (2.31)          (2.31)    
CAmerica                   -0.359           0.272           1.318***        1.016**         1.016**         1.016**  
                          (-0.55)          (0.45)          (2.80)          (2.56)          (2.56)          (2.56)    
SAmerica                    1.041           1.787***        2.628***        2.326***        2.326***        2.326*** 
                           (1.61)          (2.72)          (4.86)          (4.86)          (4.86)          (4.86)    
AustOc                                                                     -0.026          -0.026          -0.026    
                                                                           (-0.05)         (-0.05)         (-0.05)    
EAsia                       0.546           0.546           1.387**         1.085*          1.085*          1.085*   
                           (0.74)          (0.74)          (2.20)          (1.88)          (1.88)          (1.88)    
WAsia                      -0.061          -0.061           0.780           0.478           0.478           0.478    
                          (-0.09)         (-0.09)          (1.40)          (0.96)          (0.96)          (0.96)    
SAsia                       0.379           0.379           1.220**         0.918*          0.918*          0.918*   
                           (0.53)          (0.53)          (2.01)          (1.66)          (1.66)          (1.66)    
SEAsia                     -0.162          -0.162           0.679           0.377           0.377           0.377    
                          (-0.21)         (-0.21)          (1.03)          (0.62)          (0.62)          (0.62)    
CAsia                      
                               
NAfrica                                                     0.841           0.539           0.539           0.539    
                                                           (1.22)          (0.84)          (0.84)          (0.84)    
SubSahAfrica                 
                                  
Constant                  -1.221**        -1.221**        -2.062***       -1.760***       -1.760***       -1.760*** 
                          (-2.21)         (-2.21)         (-5.06)         (-5.49)         (-5.49)         (-5.49)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pseudo R2                    0.085           0.124           0.182           0.169           0.175           0.182    
N                             173             173             224             251             251             251    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   1880s           1890s           1900s           1910s          1920s           1930s               
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
NWEurope                    1.453***        1.453***        1.453***        1.521***        1.695***        1.695*** 
                           (3.65)          (3.65)          (3.65)          (4.17)          (4.64)          (4.64)    
SEurope                     1.126**         1.126**         1.126**         1.085***        1.085***        1.085*** 
                           (2.53)          (2.53)          (2.53)          (2.64)          (2.64)          (2.64)    
EEurope                     1.329***        1.329***        1.329***        1.565***        1.775***        1.565*** 
                           (2.70)          (2.70)          (2.70)          (3.42)          (3.86)          (3.42)    
NAmerica                    1.507**         1.507**         1.507**         1.311**         1.311**         1.311**  
                           (2.31)          (2.31)          (2.31)          (2.07)          (2.07)          (2.07)    
CAmerica                    1.016**         1.016**         1.194***        0.999***        0.999***        0.999*** 
                           (2.56)          (2.56)          (3.05)          (2.78)          (2.78)          (2.78)    
SAmerica                    2.326***        2.326***        2.326***        2.131***        2.131***        2.131*** 
                           (4.86)          (4.86)          (4.86)          (4.70)          (4.70)          (4.70)    
AustOc                     -0.026          -0.026           0.314           0.119           0.119           0.119    
                          (-0.05)         (-0.05)          (0.65)          (0.26)          (0.26)          (0.26)    
EAsia                       1.085*          1.085*          1.085*          0.890           1.246**         1.246**  
                           (1.88)          (1.88)          (1.88)          (1.60)          (2.34)          (2.34)    
WAsia                       0.478           0.478           0.478           0.528           0.890**         0.890**  
                           (0.96)          (0.96)          (0.96)          (1.19)          (2.15)          (2.15)    
SAsia                       0.918*          0.918*          1.235**         1.040**         1.040**         1.040**  
                           (1.66)          (1.66)          (2.35)          (2.07)          (2.07)          (2.07)    
SEAsia                      0.377           0.377           0.377           0.182           0.182           0.597    
                           (0.62)          (0.62)          (0.62)          (0.31)          (0.31)          (1.16)    
CAsia                         
                               
NAfrica                     0.539           0.539           0.539           0.344           0.344           0.344    
                           (0.84)          (0.84)          (0.84)          (0.55)          (0.55)          (0.55)    
SubSahAfrica               
                                 
Constant                  -1.760***       -1.760***       -1.760***       -1.565***       -1.565***       -1.565*** 
                          (-5.49)         (-5.49)         (-5.49)         (-5.57)         (-5.57)         (-5.57)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pseudo R2                    0.182           0.182           0.168           0.172           0.184           0.170    
N                             251             251             251             251             251             251    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  1940s            1950s           1960s          1970s           1980s           1990s           2000s         
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
NWEurope                    1.872***        1.372***       -0.585**        -1.051***       -1.051***       -0.969***       -0.963*** 
                           (5.10)          (3.96)         (-1.97)         (-3.34)         (-3.34)         (-2.96)         (-3.00)    
SEurope                     1.085***        0.936**        -1.021***       -1.487***       -1.487***       -1.253***       -0.613*   
                           (2.64)          (2.37)         (-2.90)         (-4.05)         (-4.05)         (-3.41)         (-1.65)    
EEurope                     1.565***        1.416***       -0.541          -1.007**        -1.007**                        -0.125    
                           (3.42)          (3.19)         (-1.33)         (-2.40)         (-2.40)                         (-0.26)    
NAmerica                    1.311**         1.162*         -0.795          -1.261**        -1.261**        -1.440**        -1.346**  
                           (2.07)          (1.87)         (-1.33)         (-2.08)         (-2.08)         (-2.36)         (-2.21)    
CAmerica                    0.999***        0.850**        -1.025***       -1.491***       -1.491***       -1.671***       -1.576*** 
                           (2.78)          (2.49)         (-3.55)         (-4.87)         (-4.87)         (-5.25)         (-5.06)    
SAmerica                    2.131***        1.982***        0.250           0.060           0.060          -0.119          -0.025    
                           (4.70)          (4.52)          (0.60)          (0.13)          (0.13)         (-0.25)         (-0.05)    
AustOc                      0.119          -0.030          -1.987***       -1.903***       -1.903***       -2.083***       -1.989*** 
                           (0.26)         (-0.07)         (-4.92)         (-5.42)         (-5.42)         (-5.76)         (-5.59)    
EAsia                       2.239***        2.090***        0.133          -0.333          -0.333          -0.512          -0.418    
                           (4.02)          (3.83)          (0.26)         (-0.63)         (-0.63)         (-0.96)         (-0.79)    
WAsia                       1.439***        1.290***       -0.288          -0.333          -0.483           0.095          -0.056    
                           (3.62)          (3.39)         (-0.85)         (-0.90)         (-1.33)          (0.21)         (-0.14)    
SAsia                       1.565***        1.669***       -0.288          -0.483          -0.483          -0.662          -0.568    
                           (3.22)          (3.50)         (-0.65)         (-1.03)         (-1.03)         (-1.39)         (-1.21)    
SEAsia                      1.134**         1.846***       -0.111          -0.333          -0.577          -0.512          -0.125    
                           (2.42)          (4.07)         (-0.27)         (-0.75)         (-1.34)         (-1.13)         (-0.26)    
CAsia                                                                 
    
NAfrica                     0.344           1.276***       -0.402          -0.868*         -0.868*         -1.047**        -0.953**  
                           (0.55)          (2.59)         (-0.88)         (-1.85)         (-1.85)         (-2.19)         (-2.01)    
SubSahAfrica               
   
EEurope                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                  
Constant                   -1.565***       -1.416***        0.541***        1.007***        1.007***        1.187***        1.093*** 
                          (-5.57)         (-5.51)          (2.92)          (4.75)          (4.75)          (5.19)          (4.98)    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pseudo R2                    0.202           0.180           0.142           0.180           0.172           0.216           0.202    
N                             251             251             251             251             251             239             251    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 3 Results form the canonical correlation analysis on decadal averages  
 
Table 6 
Canonical correlation between components of polity2 and polyarchy per decade with and without 
correction for sample selection bias 1820s-2000 (t-statistics are reported in parentheses) 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   1820s                           1830s                           1840s                 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                                                                                                  
xrcomp                      0.445          -0.003          -0.033           0.016           0.093           0.009    
                           (1.24)         (-0.02)         (-0.20)          (0.11)          (0.38)          (0.21)    
xropen                     -0.069          -0.075          -0.247          -0.120          -0.408          -0.068    
                          (-0.13)         (-0.24)         (-0.72)         (-0.39)         (-0.80)         (-0.73)    
xconst                      0.352***       -0.097           0.493***        0.068           0.444***        0.003    
                           (3.08)         (-1.44)          (7.52)          (1.19)          (4.53)          (0.14)    
parreg                      0.346          -0.461          -0.038          -0.022           0.158           0.011    
                           (0.44)         (-0.97)         (-0.12)         (-0.07)          (0.33)          (0.13)    
parcomp                    -0.178           0.135          -0.190          -0.079          -0.063          -0.040    
                          (-0.61)          (0.74)         (-1.26)         (-0.55)         (-0.25)         (-0.87)    
polmills                                    0.239***                        0.399***                        0.108*** 
                                           (7.11)                          (7.53)                         (24.97)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                                                                                               
competition                 0.005           0.005           0.081***        0.019*          0.060***        0.004    
                           (0.21)          (0.37)          (7.38)          (2.01)          (3.63)          (1.50)    
participation               1.336***       -0.369*         -0.117          -0.064           0.080          -0.023    
                           (3.72)         (-1.81)         (-1.27)         (-0.80)          (0.83)         (-1.37)    
polymills                                   0.181***                        0.287***                        0.106*** 
                                           (9.38)                          (9.88)                         (32.82)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
cancor                      0.780           0.913           0.840          0.875            0.700          0.985                                   
N                            24              24              34              34              38              38    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   1850s                           1860s                           1870s                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
xrcomp                      0.027           0.000          -0.037           0.020          -0.160           0.024    
                           (0.13)          (0.01)         (-0.19)          (0.47)         (-0.68)          (0.56)    
xropen                     -0.172           0.078           0.170           0.042           0.413          -0.004    
                          (-0.37)          (0.73)          (0.47)          (0.51)          (0.90)         (-0.05)    
xconst                      0.416***        0.011           0.362***        0.007           0.339***        0.003    
                           (5.00)          (0.58)          (4.68)          (0.39)          (3.63)          (0.16)    
parreg                     -0.330          -0.107          -0.532          -0.121           0.243          -0.078    
                          (-0.76)         (-1.06)         (-1.17)         (-1.19)          (0.52)         (-0.91)    
parcomp                     0.155           0.029           0.296           0.049           0.046           0.041    
                           (0.68)          (0.53)          (1.31)          (0.98)          (0.17)          (0.84)    
polmills                                    0.240***                        0.253***                        0.260*** 
                                          (20.63)                         (24.27)                         (25.06)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
competition                 0.066***        0.002           0.053***        0.001           0.036***       -0.002    
                           (5.66)          (0.82)          (5.36)          (0.41)          (2.72)         (-0.90)    
participation              -0.014           0.004           0.045           0.001           0.118**         0.001    
                          (-0.29)          (0.37)          (1.06)          (0.07)          (2.20)          (0.08)    
polymills                                   0.107***                        0.112***                        0.113*** 
                                          (25.48)                         (27.67)                         (28.02)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
cancor                                                                                                               
N                              38              38              42              42              44              44    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   1880s                           1890s                           1900s                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
xrcomp                      0.074           0.011           0.279           0.028           0.274*          0.057    
                           (0.32)          (0.23)          (1.58)          (0.53)          (1.82)          (1.13)    
xropen                      0.044          -0.063          -0.247          -0.113          -0.746**        -0.125    
                           (0.09)         (-0.59)         (-0.64)         (-0.97)         (-2.37)         (-1.19)    
xconst                      0.306***       -0.029           0.272***       -0.026           0.302***       -0.010    
                           (3.44)         (-1.52)          (4.47)         (-1.38)          (5.26)         (-0.49)    
parreg                     -0.122           0.063           0.458           0.006           0.317           0.007    
                          (-0.23)          (0.56)          (1.14)          (0.05)          (1.08)          (0.07)    
parcomp                     0.239          -0.077          -0.143          -0.050          -0.011          -0.037    
                           (0.85)         (-1.32)         (-0.69)         (-0.80)         (-0.07)         (-0.74)    
polmills                                    0.197***                        0.195***                        0.197*** 
                                          (20.47)                         (20.33)                         (22.41)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
competition                 0.046***       -0.003           0.033***       -0.001           0.045***       -0.000    
                           (3.03)         (-1.05)          (3.14)         (-0.28)          (5.90)         (-0.11)    
participation               0.058          -0.003           0.088**        -0.012           0.007           0.002    
                           (1.06)         (-0.26)          (2.29)         (-1.05)          (0.33)          (0.31)    
polymills                                   0.179***                        0.179***                        0.183*** 
                                          (21.38)                         (20.99)                         (23.86)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
cancor                      0.593           0.964            0.732          0.964           0.770           0.965                                                               
N                              45              45              45              45              50              50    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   1910s                           1920s                           1930s                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
xrcomp                      0.259           0.057           0.046           0.033          -0.044          -0.016    
                           (1.64)          (0.75)          (0.45)          (0.75)         (-0.57)         (-0.41)    
xropen                     -0.355          -0.302*          0.414          -0.150           0.332*         -0.017    
                          (-0.96)         (-1.70)          (1.65)         (-1.35)          (1.88)         (-0.19)    
xconst                      0.197***        0.065**         0.172***       -0.002           0.312***        0.022    
                           (3.18)          (2.13)          (3.94)         (-0.12)          (9.92)          (1.37)    
parreg                      0.333           0.045           0.636***       -0.114           0.244          -0.006    
                           (1.13)          (0.31)          (3.05)         (-1.19)          (1.57)         (-0.08)    
parcomp                     0.144           0.030          -0.112          -0.016          -0.072           0.008    
                           (0.98)          (0.42)         (-1.19)         (-0.40)         (-0.98)          (0.22)    
polmills                                    0.265***                        0.266***                        0.291*** 
                                          (14.90)                         (26.90)                         (36.26)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
competition                 0.029***        0.005           0.026***       -0.000           0.034***        0.003*   
                           (4.27)          (1.49)          (4.88)         (-0.03)         (10.55)          (1.71)    
participation               0.043**         0.010           0.025***       -0.003           0.012**         0.001    
                           (2.52)          (1.20)          (2.85)         (-0.86)          (2.58)          (0.29)    
polymills                                   0.234***                        0.266***                        0.284*** 
                                          (16.63)                         (30.93)                         (38.42)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
cancor                      0.741           0.920           0.876           0.972           0.928           0.980                                          
N                              58              58              62              62              65              65    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   1940s                           1950s                           1960s                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
xrcomp                      0.211**        -0.007           0.249***        0.042           0.058          -0.016    
                           (2.22)         (-0.84)          (2.97)          (1.38)          (1.09)         (-0.34)    
xropen                      0.071           0.028           0.337*         -0.050           0.505***        0.206*   
                           (0.30)          (1.45)          (1.88)         (-0.77)          (3.70)          (1.78)    
xconst                      0.105**         0.005           0.062          -0.027*          0.143***        0.039    
                           (2.57)          (1.34)          (1.39)         (-1.70)          (4.62)          (1.50)    
parreg                     -0.142          -0.034**        -0.066           0.037           0.072           0.005    
                          (-0.70)         (-2.04)         (-0.34)          (0.52)          (0.50)          (0.04)    
parcomp                     0.283***        0.002           0.138           0.011           0.132**         0.057    
                           (3.06)          (0.26)          (1.62)          (0.35)          (2.14)          (1.08)    
polmills                                    0.309***                        0.395***                        0.647*** 
                                         (161.29)                         (50.25)                         (25.49)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
competition                 0.039***       -0.000           0.039***        0.001           0.040***        0.012*** 
                          (10.43)         (-0.73)         (17.22)          (0.95)         (22.23)          (7.61)    
participation               0.006          -0.000           0.003          -0.003***        0.005**         0.001    
                           (1.31)         (-0.44)          (1.04)         (-3.44)          (2.46)          (0.46)    
polymills                                   0.312***                        0.460***                        1.466*** 
                                         (173.25)                         (52.54)                         (26.13)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
cancor                      0.886           0.999           0.902           0.986           0.918           0.940                              
N                              76              76              84              84             122             122    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                   1970s                           1980s                           1990s                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
xrcomp                      0.011           0.058           0.098***        0.079**         0.052          -0.058    
                           (0.27)          (1.58)          (3.01)          (2.54)          (1.06)         (-1.27)    
xropen                      0.154           0.041          -0.053          -0.056           0.029           0.011    
                           (1.39)          (0.43)         (-0.57)         (-0.63)          (0.25)          (0.11)    
xconst                      0.102***        0.073***        0.110***        0.109***        0.205***        0.210*** 
                           (3.49)          (2.89)          (4.26)          (4.43)          (5.64)          (6.09)    
parreg                      0.160           0.108           0.319***        0.173*          0.058          -0.305*** 
                           (1.08)          (0.84)          (3.18)          (1.74)          (0.50)         (-2.80)    
parcomp                     0.287***        0.131**         0.167***        0.185***        0.229***        0.260*** 
                           (4.68)          (2.46)          (3.46)          (3.98)          (4.16)          (4.87)    
polmills                                    1.015***                        0.379***                        0.972*** 
                                          (20.86)                          (8.49)                         (17.07)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
competition                 0.040***        0.025***        0.041***        0.036***        0.041***        0.022*** 
                          (27.72)         (19.68)         (33.43)         (29.49)         (20.24)         (11.19)    
participation               0.004***       -0.002           0.001          -0.001           0.004*          0.004    
                           (2.73)         (-1.14)          (0.60)         (-0.69)          (1.68)          (1.62)    
polymills                                   1.409***                        0.588***                        2.417*** 
                                          (20.94)                          (8.20)                         (17.08)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
cancor                      0.958           0.957           0.916           0.962           0.822           0.936                    
N                             135             135             135             135             158             141    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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---------------------------------------------------- 
                                   2000                             
---------------------------------------------------- 
xrcomp                      0.138          -0.031    
                           (1.36)         (-0.34)    
xropen                      0.228           0.027    
                           (1.15)          (0.16)    
xconst                      0.210***        0.227*** 
                           (3.10)          (4.01)    
parreg                     -0.074          -0.146    
                          (-0.40)         (-0.93)    
parcomp                     0.161*          0.085    
                           (1.90)          (1.18)    
polmills                                    1.194*** 
                                          (13.86)    
---------------------------------------------------- 
competition                 0.039***        0.018*** 
                          (11.13)          (5.75)    
participation               0.006           0.001    
                           (1.37)          (0.18)    
polymills                                   2.774*** 
                                          (14.09)    
---------------------------------------------------- 
cancor                      0.821           0.868             
N                             144             139    
---------------------------------------------------- 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
